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of the first degree and imposing the death penalty. (See §§
189, 190; Pen. Code.)
,
The judgment is affirmed.

[L. A. No. 18517. In Bank.

Feb. 8,1943.]

DANT & RUSSELL, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES et aI., Respondents.
[1] Commerce-Taxation~Imports.-U. S. Const., art. I, § 10, for-

bidding state duties on imports, does not apply to goods shipped
from an unincorporated territory of the United States, such as
the Philippine Islands, whether or not the goods are in original unsold packages.
[2] Id.-Regulation.-,.U. S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3,protects goods
from state and local taxation while in transit through the state
and from discriminatory state legislation because of its out-ofstate origin after transit ends.

[3] Id.-TaxatioIi-Imports.-Goods which were shipped from the
Philippine Islands"and which have come to rest here and are
being held at the pleasure of the owner or for shipment elsewhere as his interest dictates, are subject to taxation.

APPEAL from a judgment' of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles Comity. EmmetH. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.
, Proceeding in mandamus to compel the cancellation of tax
assessments. Judgment for defendants following the sustaining of a demurrer to the petition without leave to amend, affirmed.
Henry C. Rohr, and Stanton & Stanton for Appellant.
':j
::1

,

J. H. 0 'Connor, County Couitsel, and Gordon Boller, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.

Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny,Attorney General, H. H. Linney, Assistant Attorney General, ana
[3] See 24 Cal.Jur. 135; 26 R.C.L. 87, 120.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3J Commerce, § 8; [2J Commerce,§ 3.
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Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Ouriae
on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-At various times during the years 1937
to 1940, inclusive, mahogany lumber was shipped from the
Philippine Islands to Long Beach, California, where it was
stored in piles in the yard of a, warehouse. It was not packed
in bundles but shipped in individual pieces. None of it was
sold in this state, and no orders were received or solicited here
for sales outside the state. Pieces were sold from time to time'
on orders received at petitioner's office in Portland, Oregon,
and were delivered by the warehQusem~n to carriers for shipment to their' destination outside of California. The county
of Los Angeles levied ad valorem property taxes on the lumber remaining in the yard at. Long Beach on the first Monday
in March, 1938, and on the first Monday in March, 1939.
Petitioner appeals from a judgment entered upon an order
sustainirig without leave to amend respondents' demurrer to
the petition for a writ of mandate to compel cancellation of
the assessments.
[1]: Petitioner contends that the taxes are invalid on the
ground that they were imposed on imports in 'Violation of
the provisions of article I, section 10, of the Constitution of
the United States that'" No state shall, without the Consent
of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Exp,orls, or
Imports: .. " The word "imports,"how~ver, ~s used in
this section refers exclusively to goods shipped from a foreign
country (Sonneborn Bros. v; Oure,ton, 262 U.S. 506 [43 etCt.
643, 67 L.Ed. 1095] ; Dooley v. United States; 183 U.8.151
[22 S.Ot.'62. 46' L.Ed., 128l; E.J. McLean,&; 00; v. Denver
&; Rio Grande, R. R. Co., 203 U.S, 38127.S.Ct.;1,5iL;;Ed.,
78] ; Patapsco GU(tno Co. v. Board()f Agric~lture,171' U.S...
345, 350 t18 S.Ct.862,43'L.Ed. 1911 ;:1Vopdruf!v,. Parham,
8 Wall 123 [19 L.Ed. 382] ),andii'has long been settled'that
the Phiiipp~ne Islands are no~ a foreign country but an; unincorporated territory of the United !3ta.tes. , (DeLima v. Bid..well, 182 U.S. 1 [21 S.Ot. 743, 45L.Ed.l041J ; Downesv.Bid-,
weU, 182 U.S. 244[21 8.Ct.770,45.Ij~Ed, 1088] ; Fourjee'n
DiantOnd Rings v. Untted States, 18aU.S~ 176 [22 S.Ot. 5~,
46 L.Ed. 138] ; Gonzales v. William$~ 192 U.S.! [24 S.Ot. 171,
48 L.Ed. 311]; Oincinnati Soap 00, v" United States, 301 U.S.
308 [57 S.Ct. 764, 81 L.Ed. 1122]; The Alta, 136 F. 513 [69
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O.O.A.. 289] ; Faber v. United States, 157 F. 140.) It follows
that tb.e lumber in question does not constitute imports, and it is
immaterial whether it can be regarded as having been in
nai packages unsold at the time the taxes were levied. [2] The
commerce clause of the United States Constitution (see Hanley
v. Kansas Oity So. Ri!. 00.,187 U.S. 617 [23 8.Ct. 214,47 L.Ed.
333] ; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 [9 8.0t. 256,
32 L.Ed.637] ; E. J. McLean &; 00. v. Denver eli; Rio Grande
R. R. 00., 203 U.S. 38 [27 8.Ct. 1, 51 L.Ed. '78] ; Inter-Island
Steam Nav: 00. v. Hawaii, 96 F.2d 412, aft"d805 U.S. 806
[59 8.0t. 202, 83 L.Ed. 189] ; Pacific Ooast Dairy, Inc. v.
Dept. of Agriculture; 19 Oal.2d 818, 827 [123 P;2d '442] )
protects the lumber from state and local taxation While in
transit (Ooe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 ,[6 S.Ot. 475, 29 L.Ed.
715]; Oarson Petroleum 00. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 [49 8.0t.
292, 73 t.Ed. 626]; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 [23 S.Ot.'
259, 47 L.Ed. 859] ; Hughes Bros. Timber 00. v. Minnesota,
272 U.S. 469 [47 8. Ot. 170, 71 L.Ed. 359]) and from dis~
criminatory state legislation because of its out-of-state origin
after the transit ends. (Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 [23
L.Ed. 347]; Walling v. MiChigan, 116 U.S. 446 [6 8.0t. 454,
'29 L.Ed. 691] ;1. M. Darnell 00. eli; Son v. Memphis, 208 U.S.
113, [28 8.0t. 247, 52 L.Ed. 413].) [8] There is no contention here, however, that the taxes in question were discriminatory, and since the lumber had come to rest in this
state and was held here at petitioner's pleasure or for ship_
ment elsewhere as petitioner's interest dictated, it was a part
of the general mass of property in the state and therefore
subject to taxation. (Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 [54
8.0t. 34, 78 L.Ed. 131]; Sonneborn Bros. v. Oureton, 262
U.S. 506 [43 8.0t. 643,67 L.Ed. 1095]; Whitfield v. Ohio,
297 U.S. 431 [56 8.0t. 532, 80 L.Ed. 778] ; American Steel eli;
Wire 00. v. Speed, 192 U.S.500 [24 8.0t. 365, 48 L.Ed. 538 1.)
The judgment is affirmed.

origi~

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Edmonds, J., Oarter, J.,
and Peters,' J. pro tem., concurred.
A.ppellant's petition for a rehearing' was denied March
8,,
' 1943.
•

GUDGERV.MANTON

537

Feb. 9, "
1945.]
[L. A. No. 17852. In Bank'

UDGERRespondent, v., MABEL MANTON,
to
FRANCIS A. G
, LUCILE PUGH, Appellan ,
et al., Defendants j ,
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